Abstract

I
nstitutional legitimacy is perhaps the most important political capital courts possess. Many believe, however, that the legitimacy of elected state courts is being threatened by the rise of politicized judicial election campaigns and the breakdown of judicial impartiality. Three features of such campaigns, the argument goes, are dangerous to the perceived impartiality of courts: campaign contributions, attack ads, and policy pronouncements by candidates for judicial office. By means of an experimental vignette embedded in a representative survey, I investigate whether these factors in fact compromise the legitimacy of courts. The survey data indicate that campaign contributions and attack ads do indeed lead to a diminution of legitimacy, in courts just as in legislatures. However, policy pronouncements, even those promising to make decisions in certain ways, have no impact whatsoever on the legitimacy of courts and judges. These results are strongly reinforced by the experiment's ability to compare the effects of these campaign factors across institutions (a state Supreme Court and a state legislature). Thus, this analysis demonstrates that legitimacy is not obdurate and that campaign activity can indeed deplete the reservoir of goodwill courts typically enjoy, even if the culprit is not the free-speech rights the U.S.
Supreme Court announced in 2002. Minnesota v. White, 416 F.3d 738 (8th Cir. 2005) ). This decision has caused considerable consternation within the legal community, including among many legal scholars, based on the fear that this newly-announced judicial right will undermine perceptions within the public at large of the fairness and impartiality of courts. The assumption seems to be that what candidates for judicial offices say during their campaigns can cause fundamental disruptions in how citizens view and evaluate judicial institutions. If so, then this is very high price to pay for extending these speech rights to judicial candidates. As the dissenters in the Supreme Court argued:
Prohibiting a judicial candidate from pledging or promising certain results if elected directly promotes the State's interest in preserving public faith in the bench. When a candidate makes such a promise during a campaign, the public will no doubt perceive that she is doing so in the hope of garnering votes. And the public will in turn likely conclude that when the candidate decides an issue in accord with that promise, she does so at least in part to discharge her undertaking to the voters in the previous election and to prevent voter abandonment in the next. The perception of that unseemly quid pro quo -judicial candidates' promises on issues in return for the electorate's votes at the pollsinevitably diminishes the public's faith in the ability of judges to administer the law without regard to personal or political self-interest. (Ginsberg dissent, joined by Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, footnotes omitted, 536 U.S. 16-17.) .
Although judicial candidates are not now permitted every type of speech (promises about how one would rule in specific cases are legitimately proscribed, at least at the moment), this Supreme Court decision has opened the door to freewheeling discussions of policy issues by both incumbents and challengers for -2-judicial offices. Consequently, many believe that judicial elections now focus on judges' ideologies and judicial policy making to a far greater degree than in the past.
At the same time, interest groups and legal activists have become increasingly desirous of influencing the outcomes of state judicial elections. Their interest in state courts stems partly from the relative inactivity of the U.S. Supreme Court (which now issues fewer than 100 full opinions per year), and partly from the realization that policies made by state courts can have enormous economic, political, and social consequences (e.g., so-called tort reform). As a result, we have witnessed in the last few years an unprecedented injection of money into state judicial elections (see the activism of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the Trial Lawyers Associations; see also Echeverria 2000 , and, for a quite useful review of the relevant literature on judicial campaigns, see Baum 2003) . The confluence of broadened freedom for judges to speak out on issues, the increasing importance of state judicial policies, and the infusion of money into judicial campaigns have produced what may be described as the "Perfect Storm" of judicial elections. This storm is radically reshaping the atmosphere of state judicial elections, as it gathers strength and spreads throughout the nation.
No better illustration of this phenomenon can be found than in the judicial elections of 2004.
According to the Brennan Center at New York University Law School, candidates spent an all-time high of 24 million dollars on advertising in state supreme court elections in 2004, a dramatic increase of almost 20 % as compared to 2000 (Goldberg et al. 2005) . A total of 180 ads was produced, with 42,249 airings in 15 states. This sort of campaign effort seems to be becoming increasingly common in the American states.
With this new style of free-for-all judicial elections has come a blizzard of commentaries on the likelihood of dire consequences flowing from the politicization of state courts (on the politicization of judiciaries worldwide, see Tate and Vallinder 1995) . Many commentators fear the worst, arguing that the very legitimacy of the legal system may be eroded as people come to see law and courts as little more -3-than ordinary political institutions, and therefore worthy of their contempt and disrespect. Indeed, the 1 original justification for Minnesota's prohibition on campaign speech was precisely the state's desire to protect the legitimacy of its judiciary (but see Dimino 2003) . Minnesota contended that legitimacy requires the appearance of impartiality, that the appearance of partiality can undermine the confidence citizens have in their courts (legitimacy), and that legitimacy is crucial to the effective functioning of courts (see Brief and Appendix for Respondents 2002; see also Schultz 2006) . Alarm bells are being sounded throughout the U.S., announcing the imminent demise of legitimacy in the country's elected state courts.
To date, however, no rigorous evidence has been produced (one way or the other) on whether policy statements made during campaigns actually have any consequences at all for perceptions of judicial impartiality. Voters who want to vote on the basis of issues, for instance, are unlikely to be offput by hearing about the policy views of judicial candidates. Others may distinguish between general statements of policy preferences and specific prejudgments of individual cases. Indeed, permitting policy debates may have useful consequences, such as allowing citizens to base their voting decisions on more rational criteria (rather than on what analysts generally assume to be dicey attributes such as the candidates' genders or inferred ethnicities -see, for examples, Hojnacki 1992, and McDermott, 1997 ; but see also Hall 2001) . And whatever diminished impartiality courts and judges may suffer from today may be due to factors other than policy commitments, such as the use of attack ads and/or conflicts of interests generated by campaign contributions from litigants. We simply do not know what effect the Supreme Court's ruling will have on elected judiciaries.
We do, however, know something about how citizens perceive judicial impartiality, and, more generally, procedural fairness. This well-developed body of theory has demonstrated that impartiality is a crucial component of perceived fairness. According to Tyler (2001, 422; see also Tyler 2006) , when people assess the procedural fairness of institutions, they are "especially influenced by evidence of even--4-handedness, factuality, and the lack of bias or favoritism (neutrality)" -in short, by impartiality.
Moreover, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002) claim that it is precisely the perception that members of Congress make their political decisions on the basis of partial (e.g., self-interested) criteria that threatens the legitimacy of that institution. In the judicial case, it seems highly likely that campaign contributions from those who litigate cases before a judge generate at least the appearance of self-interested partiality and procedural unfairness. Declaring a policy view in a campaign statement may also impugn procedural fairness by implying ideological bias and the unwillingness to judge each case on its own merits. Even the use of so-called attack ads can threaten perceived impartiality by portraying candidates for judicial offices as nothing more than ordinary politicians -in bed with special interest groups, supremely selfinterested, and motivated by politics and partisanship, not law and legality. Thus, the current debate over the campaign tactics of judges maps neatly onto theories addressing institutional legitimacy, impartiality and procedural justice, and the effects of campaigns on the attitudes, beliefs, and expectations of ordinary people.
My purpose here is therefore to investigate the impact of campaign activity on the perceived impartiality of courts. I do so since impartiality is a key source of judicial legitimacy. I focus on judicial races in the state of Kentucky, where a representative sample of that state's citizens was surveyed by telephone in the summer of 2006. During the interview, an experimental vignette was put to the respondents. The hypotheses tested by the manipulations in that vignette address the effects of campaign contributions, candidates' policy promises, and attack ads on the perceived impartiality of the justices and the Kentucky Supreme Court. Because it is always revealing to compare courts to other political institutions, half of the respondents were told a story about a candidate for the Kentucky Supreme Court; the other half, about a candidate for the Kentucky State Senate. Before turning to the empirical findings of the experiment, it is useful to review the theory ascribing political significance to the legitimacy of judicial institutions.
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THEORIES OF LEGITIMACY AND IMPARTIALITY
Social scientists have long been concerned with understanding the legitimacy of all political institutions, but of courts in particular. Every institution needs political capital in order to be effective, to get its decisions accepted by others and be successfully implemented. Since courts are typically thought to be weak institutions -having neither the power of the "purse" (control of the treasury) nor the "sword"
(control over agents of state coercion) -their political capital must be grounded in resources other than finances and force. For courts, political capital can be indexed by institutional legitimacy. 2 Legitimacy Theory is one of the most important frameworks we have for understanding the effectiveness of courts in democratic societies. Fortunately, considerable agreement exists among social scientists and legal scholars on the major contours of the theory. For instance, most agree that legitimacy is a normative concept, having something to do with the right -moral and legal -to make decisions.
"Authority" is sometimes used as a synonym for legitimacy. Institutions perceived to be legitimate are those with a widely accepted mandate to render judgments for a political community. "Basically, when people say that laws are 'legitimate,' they mean that there is something rightful about the way the laws came about . . . the legitimacy of law rests on the way it comes to be: if that is legitimate, then so are the results, at least most of the time" (Friedman 1998, 256) .
Courts derive their legitimacy at least in part by differentiating themselves from other political institutions: Citizens do not naturally distinguish between the judiciary and the other branches of government. That courts are special and different must be learned. Thus, those most ignorant about politics -and with little exposure to judicial politics -are likely to hold views of courts and other political institutions that are quite similar: Courts are not seen as special and unique.
Exposure to legitimizing judicial symbols reinforces the process of distinguishing courts from other political institutions. The message of these powerful symbols is that "courts are different," and owing to these differences, courts are worthy of more respect, deference, and obedience -in short, -6-legitimacy. Because courts use non-political processes of decision making (and since the American people do not necessarily approve of the decision-making procedures common to democratic political institutions -Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995), and since judicial institutions associate themselves with symbols of impartiality and insulation from ordinary political pressures, those more exposed to courts come to accept the "myth of legality." This process of social learning explains why citizens who are more aware of and knowledgeable about courts tend to adopt less realistic views of how these institutions make decisions and operate (e.g., Scheb and Lyons 2000) . Thus, courts profit greatly from the 3 perception that they are not like ordinary political institutions. They are different owing primarily to their decision-making processes. Judges are not perceived as self-interested; rather, they are impartial.
The threat of politicized judicial campaigns is that electioneering activity may undermine the belief that courts are essentially non-political institutions. Citizens may learn that courts are quite like other political institutions if that is the message to which people are exposed during elections. Indeed, precisely the most worrisome consequence of the politicized style of judicial elections is that, to the extent that campaigning takes on the characteristics of "normal" political elections, courts will be seen as not special and different, with the consequence that their legitimacy may be undermined. At the most general level, I hypothesize that those who become aware of and attuned to campaigns in politicized judicial elections will judge courts and other political institutions similarly, and will therefore extend less legitimacy to the judiciary. The specific campaign activity I consider here includes: (1) the use of attack ads, (2) the receipt of campaign contributions by candidates, and (3) statements of policy positions given by candidates for office.
Attack Ads
A voluminous literature addressing the effects of negative campaigns on citizens exists, even if little consensus has been reached. Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1995) , and others, document a significant drop 4 -7-in voter turnout associated with negative ads (presumably due to "tuning out" the electoral process).
Challenges to this conclusion, however, are many (e.g., Finkel and Geer 1998; Geer 2006 ) and growing (e.g., Brooks 2006) . Nonetheless, it seems transparently obvious that candidates for political office believe such campaigns to be effective (as do the critics of negative advertising). Yet, in a very important meta-analysis of the research literature, Lau et al. (1999) conclude that negative campaign ads have few consequences, although they acknowledge that virtually no research examines the long-term implications of such ads (860), as in the consequences for broader institutional legitimacy (see also Lau and Pomper 2002) . From the perspective of research on institutional legitimacy, not much of the extant literature on negative campaigning is relevant, since no studies have examined judicial campaigns, and since quite different dependent variables are typically analyzed. 
Campaign Contributions
Scholars have become interested in the influence of campaign contributions on state judiciaries. For 7 instance, research has shown that campaign contributors in fact appear in courts before judges to whom they have given campaign contributions (e.g., Hansen 1991, and Dubois 1986) . Furthermore, anecdotal evidence discovers a relationship between such contributions and individual court decisions (e.g., Banner 1988, and Champagne 1988) . Some rigorous evidence suggests a connection between contributions and decisions (e.g., Ware 1999), but contrary findings also exist (e.g., on the Wisconsin Supreme Court see Office of Court Administration 1998; Jackson and Riddlesperger 1991). It is not clear, however, how widespread this perception is, and the research findings are also difficult to square with evidence that the vast majority of Americans express considerable confidence in their state courts. Even Texas' scandalridden courts are fairly positively evaluated by ordinary Texans (Cheek and Champagne 2004, 174-176) .
The question of whether campaign contributions corrupt officeholders -or whether such contributions contribute to the perception of corruption -is central in contemporary research on campaign finance. For example, the litigation over campaign contributions focuses on whether the current system adds to the appearance of corruption in American politics, thereby undermining American democracy. In the litigation on the Bi-Partisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), public-opinion experts 8 directly addressed this question (e.g., Shapiro 2003) . But in what is perhaps the definitive study on the issue, conclude that although Americans view campaign contributions as tending to corrupt legislators, the causal nexus between campaign contributions and perceptions of -9-corruption has not been established; instead, they strongly argue that observed correlations do not necessarily imply causation, and that perceptions of corruption more likely reflect generalized attitudes and propensities. They also "note the irony that the share of the population perceiving corruption declined even as soft money sky-rocketed and that the share increased after passage of the soft money ban" (2004, 123) . Primo (2002) expresses the same concern about the issue of causality and argues pointedly that: "The claim that money drives cynicism toward politics on a macro, historical level is simply false" (2002, 217) . He then goes on to draw the same conclusion from micro-level evidence (see also Coleman and Manna 2000, who find no effect on trust or efficacy from campaign spending in the 1994 and 1996 U.S. House elections). Thus, although many Americans perceive governmental corruption, and an even larger proportion favor campaign-finance reform, the evidence to date that contributions cause perceptions of corruption is ambiguous.
Nonetheless, one might still hypothesize that, in the judicial case, campaign contributions have a particularly corrosive influence on perceptions of impartiality. When contributions come from the very law firms and corporations that litigate before the judges whom they help elect, then the generally tawdry aura of contributions takes on an even more unseemly and sinister tint. Therefore, I expect that accepting campaign contributions threatens the legitimacy of both institutions and their office-holders.
Policy Commitments and Prejudgments
Of the factors considered here, the influence of policy commitments is least well understood, in large part owing to the recency of the Supreme Court decision and the different role policy pronouncements play in campaigns for courts and other political institutions. As I have noted, the theory of the states that prohibited judicial candidates from making policy commitments is that judges will be perceived to be biased and unable to evaluate future cases solely on the merits of the individual dispute. So far as I am aware, no extant empirical research has ever investigated this hypothesis. campaigns for a seat on the state court of last resort (Goldberg et al. 2005, 14) .
Kentucky lies between the extremes on this continuum. For instance, in the election of 2004, the candidates were Janet Stumbo and Will Scott, and together they raised nearly one-half million dollars in campaign contributions (Goldberg et al. 2005, 14) . By all accounts, the campaign of 2004 was fairly politicized, with candidate Scott running attack ads and candidate Stumbo running ads contrasting the two candidates (Goldberg et al. 2005, 48) . Among the 21 states in which judicial candidates raised at least some contributions in 2004, Kentucky defined the median, with candidates in 10 states raising less than $239,317 and candidates in 10 raising more than this figure. Moreover, also in 2004, abortionrelated questionnaires were distributed by interest groups to judicial candidates in Kentucky. Some candidates refused to answer the questionnaires, which promoted a well-publicized lawsuit by the Family Trust Foundation challenging legal and ethical constraints on speech that appears to commit a candidate to a position that might come before the courts. The Family Trust Foundation was successful in its litigation. Thus, in terms of the prior judicial election and the political context to which these respondents had most recently been exposed, some but perhaps not a very high degree of politicization existed. Since the interviews upon which this experiment are based took place prior to the general election season, the effects I observe from the experiment are uncontaminated by actual campaign events in 2006. So although statistical theory provides little basis for generalizing these findings to other state judiciaries, I can identify no obvious reasons why they cannot be generalized, and, on the contrary, Kentucky satisfies a number of design criteria that makes it a useful state for an inquiry such as this.
EXPERIMENTAL VIGNETTES AND TESTING CAUSAL HYPOTHESES
One of the most telling critiques of using survey data to test hypotheses is that causal inferences are suspect, especially when the independent and dependent variables are measured at the same time. But, when experiments are embedded within representative surveys, not only are findings generalizable to the -12-larger population from which the sample is drawn (external validity), but great confidence can also be placed in causal inferences (internal validity). With random assignment of respondents to vignette 9 versions, the proverbial "all else" can indeed be considered equal.
Consequently, I included within the survey an experimental vignette on campaigning and judicial legitimacy. Vignettes are a particularly useful means of incorporating the context of judicial campaigns within survey research. These short stories can reveal processes of reasoning perhaps not even directly accessible to the respondents themselves (Robinson and Darley 1998, 417) , and have been used widely in the past (e.g., Gibson and Gouws 1999) . For the purposes of the questions addressed in this article, experimental vignettes-especially when embedded in representative surveys-provide an optimal methodology (on experimentation in political science see Kinder and Palfrey 1993) .
The campaigning experiment is structured around a story about candidates for public office. The story manipulates various aspects of the campaign (e.g., the use of attack ads) in an effort to estimate the effects of such activity. At the end of the vignette, the respondents are asked a series of questions about the impartiality of the office-holders (the candidate in the story is always said to be elected to office) and the institution itself. Stories such as these have the virtue of mundane realism through verisimilitude, in the sense that they depict a set of circumstances that are concrete and easily understood by the respondents.
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The Experimental Manipulations and Hypotheses
Technically, this experiment is a between-subjects 2x3x3x2 fully crossed factorial design. As such, each respondent was told only one version of the vignette. The respondents were randomly assigned to 1 of the 36 vignette versions (by the CATI program). With less-than-perfect response rates, minor imperfections inevitably creep into survey experiments, and the number of respondents per version varies from 42 to 78. Because the experimental manipulations are orthogonal to each other, the sets of dummy variables -13-used to represent the interventions are themselves unrelated.
The Institution: The tendency to study judicial institutions in isolation, without comparison to other comparable political institutions, has long impeded our understanding of courts. Exceptions exist (e.g., Bonneau 2005) , and no one has shown us better than Hall (2001) the value of cross-institutional analysis in thinking about judicial elections and politics (see also ).
Many of the criticisms directed against judicial elections in fact are generic to all low-salience elections (e.g., McDermott 1997). Indeed, nearly all of the complaints about state judicial elections (e.g., low turnout) probably apply with equal force to state legislative elections, even though few serious observers propose that state legislators should be freed of electoral accountability. In the analysis that follows, it is useful, therefore, to compare the impact of these campaign activities on both judges and state legislators. The experiment consequently began with a random assignment of the respondent to either a story about the Kentucky Supreme Court or the Kentucky State Legislature. (See Table 1 for the text of each of the elements of the vignettes.) The overarching hypothesis of the vignette is that the judgments and evaluations of people vary across institutional contexts.
[PLACE TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] Campaign Contributions. The first substantive manipulation in the experiment has to do with campaign contributions. I sought to vary contributions by the degree to which a conflict of interest is implied. Rejecting all contributions is the condition under which no conflicts can occur; the opposite extreme involves accepting contributions from parties who do business directly before the institution, and an intermediate position involves contributors without direct business with the institution but who seek to shape public policy more generally. I hypothesize a monotonic relationship between the degree of conflict of interest and institutional legitimacy, and I suspect the relationship will deviate from linearity since the refusal to accept campaign contributions will most likely have a disproportionate effect on the protection of institutional legitimacy.
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-14-Policy Prejudgements. Policy prejudgements -to the extent they suggest to citizens that judges are deciding cases not on their individual merits, but rather on pre-existing ideological preferences -may also impugn legitimacy. The judicial and legislative versions of this vignette posit equivalent variability in the degree to which the candidate for public office commits in advance to a particular policy position, with the range defined by the old judicial rules (no policy statements allowed) to the current rules (only general policy statements allowed) to a position beyond that which is generally deemed appropriate today (specific policy pledges are made-see Table 1 ). Obviously, I hypothesize that the stronger the policy 12 pre-commitment, the less the judge and the institution will be thought to be impartial and legitimate.
Attack Ads. Finally, a third issue for judicial campaigns has to do with style of campaigning and in particular the use of so-called attack ads. This manipulation is a dichotomy, varying from innocuous campaign statements to vigorous attacks on the impartiality and fairness of the opponent. One limitation of many vignette-based studies is that the dependent variable is poorly measured, often with a single-item indicator (e.g., Gibson 2002) . The advantage of such an approach is that substantive research findings can be clearly and simply reported; but low reliability has, of course, many highly undesirable consequences for statistical analysis. Consequently, in the hypothesis testing here, I
focus for illustrative purposes on the specific items (especially the question about whether the judge/senator can be fair and impartial), but for statistical purposes, I employ a continuous indicator of reactions to the vignette. This variable is a factor score derived from a Common Factor Analysis of the three vignette judgments. For both the judicial and legislative analyses, the results reveal strongly unidimensional structures. For the Supreme Court, the factor loadings on the first unrotated factor are:
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Believe the judge can be fair and impartial .82
Acceptance of decisions as fair and impartial .75
Consider the Kentucky Supreme Court legitimate .71
This set of items is extremely reliable: alpha = .80. For the State Senate, the factor structure is similar:
Acceptance of decisions as fair and impartial .80
Believe the senator can be fair and impartial .75
Consider the Kentucky State Senate legitimate .67
Cronbach's alpha for the set of items is .78. Thus, the dependent variables for the statistical analysis of the vignette are quite valid and highly reliable.
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Manipulation Checks
In experimental studies such as this, the manipulations are not always perceived as they are intended (for a classic example, see Gibson and Gouws 2001) . Thus, it is necessary to assess empirically how the -16-respondents reacted to the elements of the stories they heard. Table 2 reports data relevant to checking the effectiveness of the manipulations. As is conventional with manipulation checks, the questions asked assess the degree to which the respondents heard and understood the attributes of the stories (see Appendix A for the text of the items used to check the manipulations).
[PLACE The results of checking the manipulations are both methodologically and substantively revealing.
Consider campaign contributions first. In the story versions in which contributions were given, most respondents perceived the contributions accurately, and practically no differences exist in perceptions of the vignette according to whether the story depicted a judge or a senator. Perhaps reflecting some 16 degree of cynicism, roughly one-third of the respondents who were told that the judge rejected campaign contributions nonetheless were certain to some degree that he in fact had received some. The results for the senate version of the vignette are similar. Nonetheless, this manipulation was generally correctly perceived by a significant majority of the respondents.
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As were the policy commitment manipulations: When the candidate was depicted as making policy promises, the respondents were substantially more certain that such promises were made (see "made policy promises" in Table 2 ). It is perhaps noteworthy that only marginal differences are found on the "made positions known" manipulation check between the expression of policy views and the making of policy promises. The former seems, to many respondents, to imply the latter. Nonetheless, this manipulation was also accurately perceived by the respondents.
Finally, the attack ad manipulation was extremely successful in both the judicial and legislative contexts, with the vast majority of respondents able to recall correctly whether such ads were used.
In general, the vignettes succeeded in the sense that the respondents perceived correctly the various manipulations. It remains then to consider whether these manipulations in fact influenced perceptions of impartiality and legitimacy.
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MULTIVARIATE RESULTS
The most efficient means of assessing these hypotheses is to create dummy variables from the manipulations and then regress the legitimacy factor scores on these indicators. In that analysis, the 18 excluded category for the campaign contribution manipulation is the scenario of no contributions; for policy commitments, it is the condition of expressing no policy views. Table 3 reports the results. So that the institutional hypothesis can be readily assessed, I report the judicial and legislative results in the same The first observation about this table is that institutional legitimacy is reasonably well-predicted (see the R statistics), especially since each of the independent variables is nothing more than a 2 dichotomy. Second, in general, the equations produce remarkably similar coefficients, indicating that cross-institutional differences, with one important exception, are largely trivial. How people evaluate the court does not differ much from how they assess the legislature.
Third, the strongest effects on institutional legitimacy come from campaign contributions. When groups with direct connections to the decision maker give contributions, legitimacy suffers substantially.
Furthermore, there appears to be nothing at all idiosyncratic about courts: Campaign contributions have nearly identical consequences for judicial and legislative legitimacy. One can see in both contexts the particularly damaging consequences of contributions from parties having direct business with the institution (litigants/contributors), an effect that significantly exceeds that of ordinary policy-oriented interest groups. In the absence of campaign contributions, the legitimacy of both institutions is high (see the intercepts, which of course also reflect the conditions of no policy commitments and no attack ads). [PLACE FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
In contrast to the findings on campaign contributions, policy commitments have no impact whatsoever on the legitimacy of the Supreme Court, even while having a positive influence on the legitimacy of the state legislature. These relationships are depicted in Table 3 (above) in the OLS analysis, and in Figure 2 for the specific question about institutional legitimacy. For the legislature, promises to make specific decisions influence legitimacy more than do general policy statements, a finding presumably grounded in the popular expectation that legislators should make and honor campaign
promises. But for the judicial candidates, even promises to decide cases in specific ways have no consequences at all for the legitimacy of the institution. This is an important finding that may indicate
that people recognize that judges make policy and that, in a democracy, some degree of political accountability ought to be imposed on policy makers. It also seems as if people are thinking in terms of policy, not necessarily individual cases. When they think about issues like the right to abortion, they are probably not focusing on the specific individual seeking an abortion (or those who would prohibit it) but rather on legal policy about whether (and when) abortions can be had. Given the widespread debates in American society about judicial philosophies and ideologies, it would be perhaps surprising were this otherwise. The data are striking and compelling in revealing that making policy statements during campaigns does not seem to render a judge unable to make fair and impartial decisions on the bench, at least in the eyes of ordinary people.
[PLACE FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
The contrast between the judicial and legislative findings is especially striking. Conventional The judicial coefficients in Finally, these findings demonstrate the value of cross-institutional analysis. At least with regard to campaign contributions and attack ads, the data reveal little about courts that is unique. To the extent that campaigning affects the legitimacy of institutions, it does so similarly for courts and legislatures.
Conditional Analysis
Experiments have the invaluable asset of being self-contained sets of hypotheses. Nonetheless, conditional effects may still be present -the experimental stimuli may be received differently by Consequently, politicized campaigning is likely to be considered a threat to judicial legitimacy.
Second, knowledge may moderate these relationships: Just as with institutional support, those who are more knowledgeable about courts are more likely to view them as distinctive institutions, with non-political characteristics. They therefore are more likely to be negatively influenced by politicized campaigning, judging such activity as inappropriate for courts and judges.
Thus, the hypotheses predict that the negative effects of campaign contributions, attack ads, and policy promises are greater among those more knowledgeable and who express greater support for the court, and therefore the interactive coefficients are expected to be negative (exacerbating the undermining influence on judicial legitimacy of the campaign stimuli). Given the limits of the survey,
these hypotheses can only be tested for those respondents who heard the vignette about the Supreme Court. The measures of both institutional support and knowledge of the Kentucky judiciary are discussed in Appendix A.
Consider first the impact of institutional support (which varies from 0 to 8). When the interaction terms are added to the equation reported in Table 3 (above), including of course the direct effect of institutional support, the only significant interactive effect is between support and policy promises -no effect is observed for campaign contributions or for the use of attack ads. When support is at its lowest 20 -21-(0), the effect of policy promises on legitimacy is significantly positive (b = .14): promises enhance perceived judicial legitimacy. As support for the court increases, the effect of promises declines (b = -.04), so that at the highest level of institutional support (8) , the coefficient for policy promises is -.21.
This coefficient is substantial, achieving roughly the magnitude of the effect of campaign contributions from policy-minded groups (although smaller than the effect of contributions from those litigating before the court -see Table 3 , above). As citizens become more supportive of the Kentucky Supreme Court, the effect of policy promises becomes corrosive.
However, two important caveats must be attached to this finding. First, the number of citizens at the highest level of support for the court is small (about 3 % of the sample), so that for most citizens of Kentucky, policy promises have little meaningful consequences for institutional legitimacy. Second, I
observe no interactive effect whatsoever between institutional support and the simple expression of policy views (in contrast to policy promises). Even among the most supportive citizens, this sort of campaign activity has no negative consequences at all. Thus, the hypothesis of an interaction between institutional legitimacy and campaign activity is supported, but only for the most extreme form of policy promises and only among a fairly rare slice of the total population.
The hypothesized interaction between knowledge and campaign activity receives even weaker support. The only significant interaction is between knowledge and the expression of policy views (not policy promises). But contrary to the hypothesis, as knowledge of the courts increases, the negative effect of policy statements weakens (b = .06), so that at the highest level of knowledge the coefficient for policy statements is +.08. Although this effect is statistically significant, it is relatively small, and, to reiterate, no such effect is observed on the impact of policy promises. Thus, the prudent conclusion is that the effect of campaign activity varies little according to levels of knowledge of the Kentucky judiciary.
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Perhaps the most important conclusion emerging from this analysis has to do with variability across the three types of campaign practices. The detrimental effects on institutional legitimacy of -22-campaign contributions are substantial and uniform across various subgroups in the total population. The same can be said of the influence of attack ads (except that the influence is considerably weaker than that of contributions). Some evidence suggests that explicit policy promises undermine legitimacy among those already most supportive of the Court, but this is a small portion of the population, and the effect is not observed under the condition of general policy statements by candidates. Thus, it appears that there is a consensus of expectations regarding the undesirability of campaign contributions and attack ads, but with more disagreement about whether explicit policy promises are appropriate. In general, the results of this conditional analysis are illuminating but change little the overall conclusions from the experiment. Owing to the structure of the experiment and the survey, both the internal and external validity of these conclusions is unusually robust.
Many judicial analysts seem to believe that campaigns present unique problems for courts. That position is decidedly not supported by this analysis. Those who worry about the corrosive effects of campaign contributions and attack ads on courts would do well to expand their concern to legislatures (and, most likely, other political institutions as well). Indeed, it is remarkable how similar these findings are for both the court and the legislature.
When it comes to policy pronouncements, the judiciary does seem to differ from the legislature, but not in the way ordinarily assumed.
Perhaps the single most important finding of this article is that candidates for judicial office can engage in policy debates with their opponents without undermining the legitimacy of courts and judges. I have speculated that this finding reflects the sophistication of the
American mass public in recognizing that judges do (and perhaps must) make public policy, that on broad policy issues some degree of accountability is desirable, and that the expression of policy views does not prejudice the rights of individual litigants to fair and impartial hearings before a court. To the extent that the state judiciaries are threatened today by campaign activity it is not because the U.S.
Supreme Court awarded judicial candidates free speech rights in its 2002 decision.
What I cannot conclude from this analysis, however, is whether the legitimacy-threatening effects of campaign contributions and attack ads will persist over time. Grosskopf and Mondak (1998) have suggested, for instance, that the half-life of the effects of exogenous events can be quite short (see also Hoekstra 2003) . Citizens may be offput by campaign activity, but we do not know whether their displeasure endures. One possibility is that there are so many other legitimizing symbols associated with courts that the effects of campaigning quickly dissolve (i.e., the so-called positivity bias asserted by -24- Gibson and Caldeira 2006) . Obviously, the connection between cause and effect (the manipulation and the response) is highly compressed in this experiment (as in all experiments); no single survey can ever document that changes that occur during the interview in fact are obdurate. Further research on this issue is certainly necessary.
Nonetheless, it seems clear that perceptions of institutional legitimacy are shaped to some degree by exogenous events: campaign activity matters to institutions. Loyalty toward institutions is not unalterable, even if it is relatively insensitive to policy debates among judges. Those concerned about threats to the legitimacy of elected state courts would do well to turn their attention away from substantive policy pronouncements and focus instead on the corrosive effects of politicized campaigning, and especially campaign contributions from those having business before the bench.
Finally, it is worth reiterating that much more research is necessary to confirm the generalizability of these findings. Given the hypothetical nature of the vignette, I doubt there is much that is "Kentucky-specific" in these findings, but I could easily be wrong. Perhaps in highly partisan and politicized states, citizens have come to accept the inevitability of campaign contributions and therefore their effect is muted. Perhaps in "virgin" states, policy pronouncements are more eye-catching and have more deleterious consequences. It would not be entirely surprising to find that the effects of all types of campaign activities are strongly conditioned by the expectations citizens hold of candidates and institutions. Thus, future research should consider whether these findings of the "high, medium, and low" implications of contributions, attack ads, and policy pronouncements, respectively, are peculiar to certain types of state judicial systems or constitute a more general phenomenon.
-25- 
No conflictNo contributions
Judge Anderson has been offered campaign contributionsthat is, money -from corporations and public interest groups, but he declines to accept any contributions whatsoever, saying that he wants to avoid any threats to his impartiality when deciding cases before the Kentucky Supreme Court.
Senator Anderson has been offered campaign contributions -that is, money -from corporations and public interest groups, but he declines to accept any contributions whatsoever, saying he wants to avoid any threats to his impartiality when voting on legislation in the Kentucky Senate.
-35-
Policy Commitments
No 
Attack Advertising
No attack ads Judge Anderson's campaign ads rarely mention his opponent, instead focusing on providing voters information about himself, and claiming that, if elected, he will make fair and impartial decisions on cases before the court.
Senator Anderson's campaign ads rarely mention his opponent, instead focusing on providing voters information about himself, and claiming that, if elected, he will make fair and impartial decisions on legislation before the Senate.
Attack ads
Judge Anderson's campaign ads vigorously attack his opponent, claiming that his opponent is biased in favor of insurance companies and other such businesses, and would therefore not be able to make fair and impartial decisions if elected to the Supreme Court.
Senator Anderson's campaign ads vigorously attack his opponent, claiming that his opponent is biased in favor of insurance companies and other such businesses, and would therefore not be able to make fair and impartial decisions if elected to the Senate.
-36- Campaign contributions: Degree of certainty about receipt of campaign contributions. Policy commitments: Degree of certainty that policy positions were made known. Degree of certainty that promises were made about how cases would be decided. Attack advertising: Degree of certainty that attack ads were used.
In all instances, the response set varies from 1 to 10 (very certain).
Difference of means test: p < .000, ç = .25. American politics without making a distinction between corporations and their political action committees. Finally, and perhaps most important, across the three versions of this manipulation, the description of the contributions was a constant (see Table 1 , above): the contributions came from "corporations and public interest groups." Thus, since this is a constant, any observed variability across the vignette versions cannot be attributed to this factor. It is reasonable to conclude that the crucial aspect of the manipulation is not so much who gave the contributions as it is the relationship between the contributor and the officeholder and the possibility that a direct conflict-of-interest is created by the contributions.
12. The policy commitment was framed in this general fashion so as not to imply the adoption of any particular position that might or might not be attractive to the respondent. When stated this way, the experimental manipulation is to some degree independent of whether the respondent agrees or disagrees with the views being expressed by the candidate.
13. In all ads, it is possible to distinguish between the tone of the ad (attack/negative versus not) and the substantive position advocated and whether the respondent agrees with it. In this experiment, I focus only on the former. Given the random assignment of respondents to vignette versions, I can assume that any effect of ad tone is independent of the ad's position. It is reasonable to hypothesize that the effect of ad tone varies according to whether one agrees with the ad's position or not, but I have no means of testing that hypothesis in this vignette.
14. For the Supreme Court, the first two eigenvalues are 2.15 and .47, respectively, and the first extracted factor accounts for 71.7 % of the common variance. For the State Senate, the eigenvalues are 2.09 and -44-.51, with the first factor accounting for 69.7 % of the common variance.
15. The dependent variable in this analysis should be thought of as a contextualized assessment of judicial impartiality and legitimacy, and as such, contrasts with the oft-used measures of institutional support and legitimacy found in the research of Gibson and Caldeira (e.g., 2006) . For purposes of an experiment such as this, one obviously requires a specific reaction to the impartiality, fairness, and legitimacy of the people and institutions in the vignette, rather than generalized and abstract attitudes toward an institution. To the extent that there are different degrees of variability in the variables of interest here, comparing standardized coefficients can be misleading. However, as reported in the tables, the variability in the dependent variable (the legitimacy factor scores) is often quite similar across the two institutions, -45-so standardized coefficients can provide useful information in this sample. In any event, unstandardized coefficients are also reported in the table, and are most appropriate for cross-institutional comparisons.
19. This basic equation models the direct, linear effects of the variables on institutional legitimacy. I also considered interactive effects, beginning by assessing the eight two-way interactions among the manipulation dummy variables. The appropriate statistical test is of the significance of the change in R 2 with the addition of the variable set (see Cohen et al. 2003) . In the case of the legislative vignette, the change in R is trivial and insignificant, and not a single interaction term is statistically significant. In the 2 court vignette, R did significantly increase with the full set of interaction terms (p = .048), but only a 2 single interaction achieved statistical significance: that between the expression of policy views and the use of attack ads. I have carefully scrutinized this relationship in an attempt to understand it. Of the four cells (the results of the 2 x 2 interaction), institutional legitimacy is highest when no attack ads are used and when policy views are not given (remember that "not given" means that either no policy statements are made or specific promises are given-this is a dummy variable). In terms of the influence of attack ads, their impact is to some degree dependent upon whether policy statements are made. When they are not, attack ads are considerably more detrimental than when they are made. Perhaps this means that if there is a policy debate, many more tactics are deemed legitimate, but if debate is more "gentlemanly" then attacking one's opponent is particularly glaring and upsetting. The converse (but still the same finding) is that when attack ads are used it matters not at all whether policy pronouncements are made; when they are not used, the impact of policy statements is larger, but still small. Given the complexity of these relationships -and especially the fact that no such interactive effect was observed for the even more extreme case of explicit policy commitments -I have decided not to pursue these relationships further. I also ignore the higher order interactions, given the difficulty of providing substantive interpretations of any such effects. Thus, I conclude that the most important influences of these variables can be captured in their linear manifestations.
-46-20. See footnote 18 (above) for a discussion of the methodology of assessing interactive effects. Table 3 22. I also considered whether ideological or partisan intensity played any role in moderating these relationships, based on "folded" ideological and partisan self-identification questions. No evidence whatsoever was discovered of any interactive effects with the experimental manipulations.
The equation reported in
